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1. INTRODUCTION
Financial interests in business enterprises are becoming more complex.
No longer necessarily content to offer, sell, buy or hold traditional debt and
equity interests, business enterprises and their funders continue to explore
ways of meeting their respective and collective needs with innovative new
financial interests, instruments and offerings.' Over the years, the lines
between securities and financial products regulated under commodities,
banking and insurance law have become blurred. Moreover, with the advent
of the crowdfunding era, financial interests in business enterprises may look
less like investment instruments commonly known as common stock or
debentures, and more like loans, gambling bets, rights to consumable
products or services or charitable or other nonprofit donations.
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1 For purposes of this essay, the term "interest," when used in relation to a business
enterprise (firm or project), references the accumulated set of rights or other
benefits, responsibilities or other obligations and other terms and provisions that
the funder of a business enterprise acquires in return for the funds transferred to the
business enterprise. These terms and provisions may be embodied in one or a series
of documents. The term "instrument" labels the interest as documented, e.g.,
common stock, preferred stock, debenture, note, etc. An "offering" is a transaction
in which instruments are offered and sold. Financial interests and instruments are
those that include a pecuniary element.
2 Other scholars have noted similarities and differences between and among these
financial and financial-related interests. See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law,
with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the Regulation of Euphoric Market
Transactions, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 225, 229 (2001) (addressing "the intuition that
many modem financial market transactions have been strongly reminiscent of
gambling"); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006) ("Securities regulation is not a
consumer protection law. Rather, scholarly analysis of securities regulation must
proceed on the assumption that the ultimate goal of securities regulation is to attain
efficient financial markets and thereby improve the allocation of resources in the
economy."); Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax
Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of
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Innovations in financial interests and instruments raise a number of
important questions about regulatory authority and interpretation. How do
we classify the instruments that represent complex or hybrid financial
interests in business enterprises? What area of regulation should apply to
them? Why? What do the answers to those questions tell us, if anything,
about the current (and possible future) structure and function of domestic
and international financial regulation? This essay preliminarily explores the
features of certain financial instruments in an effort to begin to answer these
questions by focusing on what a security-a statutory and regulatory
category including specific financial instruments-is and should be under
federal securities law.
Specifically, this essay uses the growth of crowdfunding before the
enactment of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 3 (JOBS Act) to
reflect on the instruments that are considered securities under federal law.
Crowdfunding describes a variety of different models for offering and
selling financial instruments over the Internet. The interests represented by
these instruments are at least as varied as the offerings in which they are
sold, and this taxonomy of interests and instruments only becomes more
complex in light of the regulatory facilitation of crowdfunded securities
offerings through Title III of the JOBS Act, known as the Capital Raising
Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012
(CROWDFUND Act).4 A closer look at innovations in interests,
instruments and offerings in the crowdfunding era preceding this regulatory
change offers a basis for comparisons and contrasts that raises questions
about the categorization of instruments regulated as securities. These and
other questions are important to a rethinking of the structure of financial
and financially related regulation in and outside the realm of U.S. securities
law.
The thought experiment conducted through this essay proceeds in four
subsequent parts. First, this essay describes, in a general sense, the current
system of securities regulation and the securities that are the subject of that
regulatory system. Second, this essay describes and makes relevant
observations about crowdfunding-crowdfunded offerings and
crowdfunded instruments-in the era prior to the full implementation of the
CROWDFUND Act (which is expected to occur in early 2013). Based on
these first two parts, this essay continues by contextualizing crowdfunded
instruments in the greater schemes of regulation. Specifically, this part of
Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 66 n.366 (1994) ("Many states regulate the
solicitation of charitable contributions as a form of consumer protection for
unwitting donors and require charities and those soliciting for them to register with
a central agency or otherwise comply with the disclosure requirements.").
3 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
4 See id §§ 301-05.
2012 What Is a Security in the 337
Crowdfunding Era?
this essay addresses, from the standpoint of early crowdfunding interests
and instruments, the attributes of securities regulation and securities that
may make them, at least in theory, distinct from other financial regulatory
schemes and financial instruments. This part of this essay identifies
potential distinctions and relates them to broader conversations about
financial regulation and instruments, many of which are occurring at the
opposite end of the financial regulation spectrum-the end of the spectrum
that governs commodities, commercial loans and insurance products. This
essay ends with a brief conclusion.
II. U.S. FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION AND SECURITIES
The federal system of securities regulation in the United States, a
product of the federalization movement of the 1930s, has been described
and theorized in numerous works over the years. The description and
theorization of financial instruments classified as securities under that
system is similarly established and rich. This part synthesizes those bodies
of literature as a basis for the further observations and analysis that follow.
A. Securities Regulation
The federal system of securities regulation effectuates policy through
various different regulatory tools that both inform and are informed by
theoretical principles. Accordingly, it is important that we understand the
policy and theory on which the current system of U.S. securities regulation
is founded and that we understand the attributes of the resulting system of
securities regulation currently operating at the federal level in the United
States.
1. Policy
Although variously stated, the key policies underlying U.S. securities
regulation are the protection of investors and the maintenance of the
integrity of the national securities markets, with the overall objective of
enhancing prospects for capital formation to sustain business activity and
growth.5 I purposely articulate the policy objectives this way-with
5 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006) (requiring the
SEC, when it is "engaged in rulemaking and... required to consider or determine
whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest," to "also
consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation."); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006) (same); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman,
Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation,
71 S. CAL. L. REv. 903, 941 (1998) ("One of the most cited and intuitive goals of
the securities laws is the protection of investors."); Tamar Frankel, The Internet,
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investor and market protections contextualized by reference to capital
formation-but it is far from clear that my view on the arrangement of
6these policies in relation to each other is the prevailing interpretation. An
alternative formulation, for example, does not directly address market
integrity and prioritizes capital formation quite differently.
Securities regulation is generally advanced under the rubric
of "investor confidence" or "investor protection," as is the
SEC's statutory mandate. The goals of economic efficiency
and capital formation, where they appear in the federal
securities laws, serve as decidedly secondary
considerations. Moreover, the implementation of investor
protection goals may appear inconsistent across unrelated
rulemaking exercises.
Securities Regulation, and Theory of Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1319, 1325 n. 17
(1998) ("[M]any... securities acts' regulations, are based on two policies:
protecting investors, to maintain their confidence in the markets' integrity, and the
encouragement of capital formation."); Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a
Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 804 n. 179 (2006) ("Investor protection is a
means to an end-the goal of helping markets by solidifying investor trust in them
so that they may thrive."); Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for
Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 31, 45 (2007) ("[T]he goals of protecting investors, maintaining fair,
orderly and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation rephrase and
synthesize the objectives of securities regulation [are] contained within the
Exchange Act's preamble.").
6 1 am not alone in my view that capital formation is a unifying principle:
Although the primary goal of securities regulation is frequently
articulated as investor protection, this understanding is too
simplistic. Capital formation is at the heart of the capitalist
system. The reason securities regulation became a matter of
federal concern is that there was a need to increase investor
confidence in order to generate capital formation in the 1930s.
There was also a need to assure against systemic collapses caused
by excessive stock market speculation leading to the bursting of
the stock market bubble in 1929 and the bankruptcy of numerous
financial institutions. State securities regulation and SRO
regulation had proved inadequate in performing this task, which
was national in scope.
Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities
Regulation in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 545
(2003).
7 Onnig H. Dombalagian, Licensing the Word on the Street: The SEC's Role in
Regulating Information, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 33-34 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
2012 What Is a Security in the 339
Crowdfunding Era?
Regardless of the interrelationship among the three articulated policy
interests, however, it is safe to say that U.S. securities regulation exists to
protect investors, markets and capital formation.8
The notion of investor protection is commonly cited, yet rarely defined.
It is not apparent what investor protection means in different contexts.
Assuming we can identify what an investor is (and that is not as simple as it
appears), it seems appropriate to ask from what or from whom investors
need protection and how that protection might be provided. 9 Are we afraid
that investors lack leverage in seeking information or negotiating terms?
Are we concerned about bad actors engaging in activities that deceive
market participants or artificially affect investment markets? Are we
worried that certain types of transactions or certain market players are
inherently harmful to investors or markets? Thinking somewhat more
deeply, we might also ask what rules apply when the interests of one
investor negatively impact those of another or when the interests in
protecting investors, markets and capital formation otherwise collide.
Moreover, different types of investors may need different protections in
different circumstances.'0
The maintenance of market integrity is also an elusive objective. What
does it mean to maintain (protect, promote, etc.) the integrity of a market?
This question is founded on the non-obvious foundational concept of
market integrity. May we conclude that a market has integrity if market
activity is sustained over a prolonged period of time? Must we establish that
a market is efficient, competitive or free (at least substantially free) from
fraud in order to characterize it as having integrity? It is obvious that certain
8 See generally The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
9 One scholar offers the following basic answers:
Investor protection is a hallmark goal of federal securities law and
an animating principle of the SEC. Investor protection means
protecting investors from economic losses stemming from fraud
and more subtle forms of opportunism by issuers, traders, and
other market participants. The legislative history of the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act demonstrates that Congress was
concerned with ordinary investors being subjected to fraud,
inadequate disclosure, and manipulation of stock prices.
Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial
Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 240, 285 (2009)
(footnotes omitted).
10 See Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System,
34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1095 (2007) ("[R]egulation of different kinds of
investments may be directed at different kinds of investors. Hedge fund investors,
for example, tend to be wealthy and sophisticated, while mutual fund investors tend
to be middle class and unsophisticated.").
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market activities are unfair or dishonest (e.g., manipulating trading volume
or prices so that one investor can buy low or sell high, as occurs in a "pump
and dump" scheme)." However, some activities that may have undesirable
effects on securities markets do not constitute unfair or dishonest practices
(e.g., acquiring and using material, nonpublic information in a manner that
creates advantages for certain market participants but may not be deceptive,
manipulative, fraudulent or otherwise unjust).
Finally, the policy goal of promoting capital formation is somewhat
vague. Capital can take many forms. The ostensible focus of the securities
regulation system is financial capital. It is implausible that Congress
intended to encourage the formation of an infinite amount of financial
capital for all issuers under all circumstances. The concept of capital
formation typically is broadly construed in the securities regulation
context, 12 and its use as a policy objective has supported different types of
regulation at different times. Most recently, Congress turned its ostensible
1 Pump-and-dump schemes are aptly named.
In a "pump and dump" scheme, the perpetrator generally touts
("pumps") a stock by making baseless projections about its future
share price and/or unjustified forecasts about the company's
future earnings. To enhance the legitimacy of their claims, the
perpetrator often alludes to fictitious contracts or non-existent
merger talks. With the exponential growth in the number of
people using the internet over the past decade, the World Wide
Web has become the most popular medium for the perpetrator to
communicate with the investing public. As the market digests the
false and misleading information, the share price of the targeted
company usually moves dramatically in the direction intended by
the scheme's architect. When the perpetrator believes that the
market has reached the ceiling (or floor) based on the false and
misleading information that he supplied, the perpetrator sells
("dumps") their [sic] entire position and realizes a substantial
gain.
David B. Kramer, The Way It Is and the Way It Should Be: Liability Under § l0(b)
of the Exchange Act and Rule I Ob-5 Thereunder for Making False and Misleading
Statements as Part of a Scheme to "Pump and Dump " a Stock, 13 U. MIAMI Bus.
L. REv. 243, 245 (2005) (footnotes omitted); see also Christine Hurt, Moral
Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 762 (2005)
("Regulators have no problem viewing pump-and-dump schemes as manipulations
of the market .... Presumably, these schemes are undesirable because they create
inefficient markets in which investors overpay for stock and then lose money once
the hyping of the stock ends and the insiders dump their shares.").
12 See Marc I. Steinburg & Emmanuel U. Obi, Examining the Pipeline: A
Contemporary Assessment of Private Investments in Public Equity ("PIPEs'), 11
U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1, 1 (2008) (defining capital formation as "a company's ability to
effectively and efficiently raise capital for various needs at different junctures in its
life .... ").
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attention to small business capital formation in its passage of the JOBS
Act. 13 But within the past ten years or so, Congress and the SEC also have
been attentive to assisting the capital formation efforts of larger, public
issuers.
14
Thus, the policy considerations underlying U.S. securities regulation
are broad-based and give rise to many good, unanswered questions.
Moreover, these policy objectives may compete, rather than harmonize, in
certain circumstances.' 5 The financial crisis, the rise of crowdfunding and
other recent social, economic and political events and forces challenge the
notion that we have properly struck a balance among these considerations,
despite our relatively mature system of regulation. These forces are putting
pressure on the need for clearer answers to longstanding and emergent
policy-oriented questions.
2. Theory
A number of important bodies of theoretical knowledge help describe
and predict the way securities markets function and the way the participants
in those markets behave. These include efficient market theory, behavioral
finance and portfolio theory. Principles gleaned from these (and other)
theories inform or may inform the construction and modification of
structures and rules incorporated into the U.S. system of securities
regulation. I describe each of these theories in brief here.
The three different articulations of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis (ECMH, also known more generally as the efficient market
hypothesis)-strong, semi-strong and weak--each posit different ways in
which market-based, public and non-public information affects market
pricing. In general, the ECMH assumes that, in an efficient market,
13 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The JOBS Act is self-described as an
initiative "[t]o increase American job creation and economic growth by improving
access to the public capital markets for emerging growth companies." Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act pmbl., Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
14 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.);
Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act
Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.).
15 Dalley, supra note 10, at 1095 (noting that investor protection and market
enhancement goals of U.S securities regulation "are not the same and may not even
be purely complementary. Market efficiency may be enhanced, for example, when
investors' mistakes are punished by losses and investors have the opportunity to
learn to invest more rationally or to stay out of the market and leave the decision-
making to experts.").
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information is reflected in market pricing.16 Efficient markets depend on
market participants behaving in predictable, rational, utility-maximizing
ways in response to information.' 7 The dominant articulation of the ECMH
as an explanatory theory for the disclosure aspects of the current U.S.
securities regulation system is the semi-strong version of the ECMH, which
holds that all publicly available information is inculcated in the market
pricing of securities. 18 Accordingly, those who have that public information
cannot "beat the market." In other words, informed traders should have no
advantage in market transactions based on their possession of public
information.' 9 The semi-strong version of the ECMH explains and predicts
many, but not all, of the movements in and attributes of securities markets
in the United States.
Behavioral finance, a discipline at the intersection of behavioral and
cognitive psychology and traditional economic and financial theory, fills
some gaps left by the ECMH by explaining market movements and
16 See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980); see also
Shannon Rose Selden, (Self-)Policing the Market: Congress's Flawed Approach to
Securities Law Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 57, 65 (2006).
17 See Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and If So, What If
Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1036 (2009) ("The
efficient market theory assumes that securities markets operate as if the traders in
them were rational .... "); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure:
A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1035 (2000) ("Neoclassical
economics is premised on rational choice theory, which posits an autonomous
individual who makes rational choices that maximize his satisfactions."); Donald
C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 858 (1992) ("The conventional
economic model postulates that rational decision-makers search for the option
having the largest subjective expected utility, determined by reference to
probabilities derived from the available information set.").
18 See Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities
Regulation, 28 CARDozO L. REv. 333, 359 n. 11 (2006) ("Under the... semi-
strong version of the efficient market hypothesis, the market price of broadly-
traded public securities reflect[s] all publicly available information on the securities
because the actions of investment analysts and institutional investors will send
signals to the rest of the market regarding the value of the shares."). See generally
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets 11, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991); Eugene F.
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (identifying three forms of market efficiency-weak, semi-
strong and strong-that have since become iconic in the literature); Burton G.
Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59
(2003) (surveying, analyzing and explaining market efficiency and inefficiency
using statistical analysis and specific examples).
19 Cross & Prentice, supra note 18, at 333 n. 111 ("Lay investors need not be
personally conversant with the publicly available information to understand what a
fair market price for a security is, so long as the professional investors have not
been misled.").
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attributes not well accounted for by the traditional, neoclassical economic
analysis from which the ECMH is derived.2 °
Economists using innovative and interdisciplinary
approaches have become increasingly convinced that
orthodox economic theory cannot adequately explain
market and investor behavior. They challenge standard
economic views . . . . Investors, they contend, are
influenced by many factors and markets are rarely efficient.
Offering a holistic criticism (although not a coherent
alternative model), economists have identified critical
irrationalities and inefficiencies in market and investor
behavior.2 1
The operation of these identifiable irrationalities and inefficiencies is
inconsistent with the rational investor behavior model embodied in the
ECMH. The systematic (rather than individualized or episodic) presence of
biases that run counter to rational decision-making help to explain
observations about market activity that are not explained by the ECMH and
may result in better predictive capacity.
22
Portfolio theory, used by investors and investment intermediaries to
construct optimal blends of investment assets, identifies the source and
effects of risk in investment holdings. The theory generally
20 Unlike the ECMH, behavioral finance does not alone explain or predict the
market for securities in a comprehensive way. See Bainbridge, supra note 17, at
1035 ("To date, behavioral economics has not (and may not ever) develop a single
theory that explains or predicts the full range of human behavior, as rational choice
theory claims to do. Instead, it offers a pragmatic collection of 'situation-specific
mini-theories useful in the analysis of discrete legal problems."' (footnotes
omitted)).
21 Selden, supra note 16, at 66; see also Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck
Between Bottom and Top: State Competition for Corporate Charters in the
Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 681, 693-94 (2003) ("[M]any
corporate finance and law scholars have begun to call into question the semi-strong
version of the efficient market hypothesis. Advances in both behavioral finance
theory and in empirical testing have suggested that securities markets may be more
flawed than previously believed.").
22 Professor Steve Bainbridge further explains:
Standard economic analysis recognizes that individual
decisionmakers may depart from rationality, but assumes that
such departures come out in the wash-they cancel each other out
so that the average or equilibrium behavior of large groups will be
consistent with rational choice. By asserting that decisionmakers
exhibit systematic biases, behavioral economics denies that claim.
Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 1035 n.54.
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proceeds from the premise that individual stocks in a
portfolio are subject to risks that are negatively correlated,
that is, an event that will cause the rise in the price of one
stock will tend to depress the price of another. For
example, high oil prices may be good for oil companies but
bad for airlines. The object of diversification is to minimize
risks that are specific to a particular company, or perhaps a
segment of an industry. From the perspective of modem
portfolio theory, firm-specific risk represents an
impermissible speculation that can be offset, or eliminated,
by combining stocks subject to distinct risks without
reducing the average expected return. A skillfully
diversified portfolio is still subject to market-wide risks
caused by vicissitudes of the economy, but these market
risks can be set at a desired level by investing in different
categories of assets with different risks and probable
returns. Thus, the investment of a segment of a portfolio in
cash or treasury bonds will lower portfolio risk as well as
23the expected return.
While not descriptive of all investment behavior, these principal dictates of
modem portfolio theory (that investors should diversify their equity
holdings in order to decrease firm-specific risk and diversify their
investment assets across different asset classes in order to decrease systemic
risk) are the backbone of a rational, reasonable and wise investment
24strategy. However, U.S. securities regulation does not always assume that
investors are diversified and, accordingly, does not necessarily focus on
protecting diversified investors. Rather, the prevailing touchstone for
investor protection under federal securities law liability provisions is the
11 25
"reasonable investor," a term that evades simple definition.
23 Michael E. Murphy, Pension Plans and the Prospects of Corporate Self-
Regulation, 5 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 503, 508 (2007). See generally Edwin J.
Elton & Martin J. Gruber, Modern Portfolio Theory, 1950 to Date, 21 J. BANKING
& FIN. 1743 (1997) (reviewing, analyzing and applying portfolio theory as
originated by Markowitz, infra); Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77
(1952) (outlining the basis for modem portfolio theory).
24 See Dalley, supra note 10, at 1095 ("Modem portfolio theory suggests that any
rational investor will hold a well-diversified mix of common stocks and other
investments."); see also Murphy, supra note 23, at 508 ("The analysis of modern
portfolio theory strongly supports the principle that diversification is a mandatory
practice of prudent investing.").
25 The federal securities laws include a number of key liability provisions that
require the establishment of a material misstatement or an omission of a material
fact. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12(a)(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k,
771(a)(2), 77q(a) (2006), amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2012) (Rule lOb-5
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These three theories focus narrowly on investors in securities and
securities markets. Accordingly, efforts to effectuate investor and market
protection policies through legislation and agency rulemaking are often
rooted in elements of or principles derived from these theories. As a result,
these theories, together with the policies described in Part II.A.1, help
explain and define key attributes of the basic structure and operation of
federal securities regulation in the United States.
3. Resulting Regulatory System
The U.S. securities regulation regime uses three principal kinds of rules
to achieve its policy objectives. These rules-the tools in our securities
regulation toolbox-are mandatory disclosure, fraud prevention and
substantive regulation. They operate in connection with offers, purchases
and sales of (as well as other financial transactions affecting) securities and
also in connection with the exercise by security holders of voting and
consent (i.e. governance) rights. The first two tools-mandatory disclosure
and fraud prevention-are somewhat self-explanatory and well-trod in the
literature.26 Both focus to a great extent on transparency and the avoidance
or correction of informational asymmetries. The third-a more heavy-
handed, authoritarian approach-focuses on regulating the terms of and
participants in financial and governance transactions relating to securities
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended). The reasonable investor
is the reference point for determining the materiality of misstatements and
omissions under these provisions. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
23 1-32 (1988) (adopting for use under Rule lOb-5 two alternative formulations of
a materiality standard first adopted by the Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)); see also Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., LP, 634
F.3d 706, 717-18 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying the same legal standard in a case
involving sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act). See generally Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Is the Reasonable Investor a
Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 296-309 (2009) (identifying and
describing various legal conceptions of the reasonable investor).
26 See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-
Bad Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 43 (2011)
("Congress' principal intent in enacting the securities laws was investor protection
(primarily through mandatory disclosure coupled with anti-fraud rules) .... "); see
also Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
639, 662 (1999) ("United States federal securities law is based on a philosophy of
mandatory disclosure rules and anti-fraud regulations."); Frank Partnoy, Don't
Blink: Snap Decisions and Securities Regulation, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 151, 163
(2011) (referring to "mandatory disclosure and ex post anti-fraud enforcement" as
"the twin pillars of the 1930s securities laws").
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and in the securities markets.27 A brief description of each of these
regulatory methods follows.
The protection of investors and markets and the encouragement of
capital-raising activities, together with empirical evidence supporting the
semi-strong version of the ECMH, tend to favor the use of mandatory
disclosure rules and fraud-prevention disclosures. Rules encouraging
disclosure also assist investors in achieving optimal portfolio diversification
by giving them the information they need to make the requisite risk
assessments. Disclosure rules are the historical regulatory core of the two
initial (and, for my purposes here, key) federal securities laws: the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended 28 (the 1933 Act) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended 29 (the 1934 Act).
The most prominent feature of both the '33 Act and the .'34
Act is the extent to which they require disclosure of
information. The statutes and the regulations promulgated
thereunder by the SEC contain detailed disclosure
requirements and anti-fraud provisions to ensure that the
disclosures are both complete and accurate .... Both Acts
also incorporate specific anti-fraud provisions designed to
ensure that all disclosures are accurate and free of fraud.3 °
Mandatory disclosure under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act is
effectuated through the specific line-item disclosure rules in SEC forms
(e.g., registration statements under both the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, and
periodic reports, proxy statements and tender offer statements under the
1934 Act), including form requirements provided by reference to the
integrated disclosure rules in Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X.31 In
addition, the mandatory disclosure regime includes gap-filling rules that
ensure that the disclosure of information in response to line-item
requirements is not misleading as a result of the omission of important
information not expressly required to be disclosed in response to the line-
item requirements.32 Liability provisions like those in sections 11 and 12 of
the 1933 Act33 enforce these disclosure mandates. Antifraud rules in both
27 See, e.g., Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure
Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 190-203 (2006).
28 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa.
29 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2006), amended by
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
30 Carol R. Goforth, Why Limited Liability Company Membership Interests Should
Not Be Treated as Securities and Possible Steps to Encourage This Result, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1279-80 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
"' See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.703, 210.1-01-.12-29 (2012).
32 See, e.g., id. §§ 230.408, 240.12b-20.
33 Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12.
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the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act reinforce this pro-disclosure norm and also
address other deceptive and manipulative conduct in connection with
financial transactions and governance activities relating to securities.34
Disclosure is not enough to adequately protect investors and assure the
markets' integrity. When disclosure's costs outweigh its benefits, it may
have detrimental, rather than beneficial, effects on capital formation. There
are many reasons why disclosure rules are not a securities regulation
panacea. For one, mandatory and antifraud-based disclosure obligations in
U.S. securities regulation are not as well-defined as they may appear.
Disclosure rules in both contexts often require the release and dissemination
of material information.
Core doctrine in federal securities law rests on a single
word-material. Federal statutes and agency anti-fraud
rules and disclosure requirements contain the term as an
essential qualifier and identifier. Facts or information must
be material before a legal obligation to disclose attaches. In
other words, the term material has an unrivaled position in
the center of all of securities law. Agency rules and court
decisions applying the term necessarily establish the
fundamental scope and bite of securities regulation.35
Materiality is determined based on the application of a legal standard that
does not always admit to clear application in practice.36 Consequently,
materiality can be idiosyncratic and difficult to determine in certain
contexts.37
34 See, e.g., id. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b).
35 Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-defined Notion of "Material" in
Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 167, 167 (2011) (footnotes omitted).36 Id. ("A study of close to 800 cases in which a federal court applies the term to
specific facts finds that the case-law is quixotic at best, and fickle at worst."
(footnote omitted)).
37 See Mark K. Brewer et al., Reconsidering Disclosure and Liability in the
Transatlantic Capital Markets, 9 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 257, 283 (2011)
("While disclosure regimes require companies and financial institutions to provide
all material information, the offeror of securities has significant discretion in
determining which details it deems material."); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Just Do
It! Specific Rulemaking on Materiality Guidance in Insider Trading, 72 LA. L. REV.
999, 1008 (2012) ("[F]acially simple articulations of a materiality standard make
for difficult ex ante and ex post materiality determinations in many cases and allow
for the exercise of significant enforcement discretion and hindsight bias by
enforcement agents and judicial decision-makers."); Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call to Action, 52 AM.
U. L. REV. 1131, 1138-39 (2003) ("The interpretation and application of the
materiality standard are highly fact-dependent and do not always produce
predictable or certain planning options or judicial results.").
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Assuming issues of materiality can be resolved, the next hurdle is
packaging the relevant information in a manner that complies with any
mandatory disclosure prescriptions and makes it accessible to the investor
base. Often, the resulting disclosure-after information is sifted and
materiality is carefully weighed-is lengthy and difficult to parse.
In practical terms, the disclosure that we see today in
documents such as registration statements, proxy
statements, annual reports, and financial documents is often
too long and complex to be of much use to the ordinary
investor. Prospectuses have become "so elaborate that
many investors [are] unable to detect even blatant fraud
solely by reading [them]." Many argue that our current
financial disclosure rules require far too much nonessential
data. Investors faced with this flood of information often
lack the skills to identify what the information means or
how to use it effectively. The complexity and detail in
disclosure documents can make them almost
incomprehensible at times, and the disconcerting truth is
that investors will typically choose not to read documents
that they know they will not understand. Disclosure cannot
fulfill its communicative purpose if investors find it
impenetrable and therefore ignore it.
38
While acknowledging the length and density of disclosures,
commentators often assume that sophisticated investors, who are dominant
traders in securities markets, possess the requisite knowledge and skill to
evaluate accurate disclosures made by issuers of securities and others with
disclosure responsibilities under federal securities regulation in the United
States. However, issuers and their securities are increasingly complex.3 9
This constantly evolving complexity and the mispricing of securities in the
run-up to the recent financial crisis forces us to at least question the
assumption that market participants can understand and absorb the
information provided to them. 40 If a sufficient number of investors cannot
38 Ripken, supra note 27, at 185 (footnotes omitted).
39 See id ("Part of the problem is that the structure and operations of business
organizations today are more complex than ever, and the task of describing them in
simplistic terms is almost impossible."); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the
Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 12-13
(2004) (describing the growing complexity by reference to Enron's investment
structures, but arguing it exists in other, more traditional organizations as well).
40 See Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating
Agencies in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227,
276-78 (2009); Schwarcz, supra note 39, at 12-13. Misjudgments in trading before
the financial crisis also may be attributable to cognitive biases and other errors. See
generally Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A
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ftilly comprehend and digest correct and complete information that is
disclosed to them, they cannot use it to assess investment risks and effect
market transactions, and the accuracy of market pricing will suffer.4'
Disclosure also may be a suboptimal regulatory solution in U.S.
securities law for reasons other than the vagaries of applicable legal
standards and the complexity of the information being conveyed in the
current environment. The sheer volume of disclosure occasioned by the
mandatory disclosure regime-especially when some of the information has
little, if any, relevance in determining market prices or company-specific or
systemic risks-may render mandatory disclosure ineffective or inefficient
in serving its desired regulatory objectives . Mandatory disclosure rules
may be under-inclusive (failing to adequately anticipate and require
disclosure of relevant or important information) and over-inclusive
(requiring the disclosure of irrelevant or unimportant information).43 Gap-
filling and fraud-prevention rules help to address the under-inclusiveness
problem through ex post enforcement mechanisms. If overused, however,
mandatory disclosure prescriptions run a risk of burying market-relevant
facts in an avalanche of disclosed facts.
Gatekeeper's Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk
Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 1209 (2011) (offering significant description and
analysis of the cognitive bias angle).
41 See Schwarcz, supra note 39, at 18 ("[W]ith complexity, few if any investors
will actually understand the detailed disclosure. Thus, it is likely that less than a
critical mass of investors will be able to understand the disclosure in order to act to
achieve an 'efficient' market. It is even less likely that a critical mass of investors
would be able to understand the disclosure in order to act instantaneously to
achieve the efficient market." (footnotes omitted)).
42 See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1100 (1995) ("The issue is not the sheer quantity of data,
but the amount of value-relevant information; if the mandatory disclosure system
produces information that is irrelevant to stock prices, it does not meet the
efficiency criteria of the accuracy enhancement model.").
43 See Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 1056 ("[T]he mandatory disclosure regime thus
is likely to be under- and/or over-inclusive. Under-inclusive disclosure rules harm
investors by denying them information they need. Over-inclusive rules harm
investors by requiring the firm to spend money on unnecessary disclosures, which
essentially comes out of the investors' pockets."); Allen Ferrell, The Case for
Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the World, 2 BROOK. J.
CORP. FiN. & COM. L. 81, 116 (2007) ("An example of a regulatory regime gone
astray would be a mandatory disclosure regime that focuses on requiring irrelevant
information to be released. Indeed, some commentators have argued that this is
what the SEC has done in regulations implementing the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Exchange Act of 1934.").
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Moreover, while disclosure of market-relevant information is supported
by the ECMH (helping to create more accurate pricing), it does not address
behavioral biases that also may affect market pricing.
44
[A] growing body of research suggests that hypermotivated
and super-optimistic insiders in firms may act irrationally
in underestimating risks by "emphasizing positive returns
as an indication of ability and downplaying trading losses
as irrelevant." Likewise, investors may exhibit "judgment
biases that lead them to underestimate the risk that bad
things will occur." Furthermore, the proliferation of
information in the age of the Internet where many investors
rely less on experts to filter complex financial information
may result in investors actually suffering from the
requirements of securities regimes based on disclosure. As
one expert notes, "[m]ore information alone cannot cure
investors of the judgment biases that supposedly lead them
to misuse the information." Given all these contradictions
to the assumptions underlying the efficient market theory,
it is doubtful that disclosure in itself can adequately protect
investors.45
In short, "[d]isclosure may not protect investors if. . . cognitive biases
inhibit them from rationally incorporating the disclosed information into
their investment decisions. '' 6 Irrational investment behavior detracts from
accurate market pricing and decreases the efficiency of the securities
markets.
Erroneous and misleadingly incomplete disclosures also cause
inaccurate pricing. 47 The securities regulatory regime, therefore, addresses
fraudulent and other significant misstatements and misleading omissions.
Fraud and misstatements liability supplies both a means of incentivizing
accurate and complete disclosures and provides opportunities for ex post
enforcement when disclosures are incorrect or misleading by omission. Yet,
fraud and misstatements liability (like mandatory disclosure regulation) has
become particularly hard to navigate as financial instruments become ever
more increasingly complex. "[A] disclosure-based regime can allow market
participants to conceal investment risks behind opaque complex financial
44 See Ripken, supra note 27, at 160-84 (describing various cognitive biases and
their effect on the operation of the ECMH).
45 Brewer et al., supra note 37, at 281 (footnotes omitted).
46 Ripken, supra note 27, at 187.
47 See Thomas A. Lambert, Overvalued Equity and the Case for an Asymmetric
Insider Trading Regime, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1045, 1059 n.53 (2006) ("Even
adherents of the semi-strong version of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis
admit that concealment or nondisclosure of material information may result in
stock prices that fail to reflect the true value of the underlying securities.").
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instruments that neither sophisticated nor retail investors actually
understand. ''48 The regulatory system is constantly playing catch-up in its
effort to keep pace with market innovations-including those of bad actors.
Disclosure regulation through mandatory disclosure and antifraud and
misstatement liability rules is a valuable tool, but its ability to fully address
informational asymmetries and create accurate market pricing is uncertain.
Although disclosure (whether mandated or offered to avoid fraud or
misstatements liability) can be, and is, used to affect investor and issuer
behavior, it is not always the best tool for that task. Substantive regulation
is a more direct route to achieving behavioral changes. "Substantive
regulation would involve mandating certain ... conduct that we decide is
beneficial and prohibiting particular conduct that we believe is unfair and
improper. The goal of this type of regulation is to directly affect economic
behavior, and not just demand the disclosure of information about thatbehavior. ' '49
Regulators can, for example: limit the entities or individuals that may
play certain roles or engage in certain types of transactions to specified
entities or individuals; ban specified entities or individuals from playing
certain roles or engaging in certain types of transactions; require entities or
individuals to conduct their activities in a certain way (e.g., using specified
intermediaries or procedures); or mandate, allow or prohibit specified types
of transactions or transactional terms or provisions. Although substantive
regulation has been a component of the U.S. securities regulatory scheme
from its inception, its use has been growing in the new millennium.
Examples of substantive regulation that existed before the new millennium
can be found in the proxy rules adopted by the SEC in and under section
14(a) of the 1934 Act,50 tender offer regulation in and under section 14(e)
of the 1934 Act5 and the short-swing profit prohibition in and under
section 16(b) of the 1934 Act,52 among other places. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 and the resulting wave of SEC rulemaking added a number of
substantive rules to the mix, especially in relation to the composition and
operation of corporate boards of directors, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act continued this trend, perhaps most
48 Brewer et al., supra note 37, at 282.
49 Ripken, supra note 27, at 190.
50 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.14a-1-.14b-2 (2012).
51 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14e-1-.14f-1.
12 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16b-1-.16b-8; see also Ripken, supra note
27, at 190 ("Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is a good
example of a substantive rule. .. ").
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notably in the highly publicized "say on pay" and other corporate
governance provisions.
Substantive regulation, as a more direct regulatory tool, can help
protect securities investors and markets. In particular,
[s]ecurities regulation that is substantive and that prohibits
improper behavior can help revive investor trust. Investor
confidence increases, not decreases, with strong rules that
go beyond mere disclosure to govern corporate conduct
directly because such rules impose sanctions for non-
compliant behavior, whether or not the non-compliance is
disclosed and whether or not investors accurately process
the disclosure. 4
However, when market participants and transactions are substantively
regulated, that substantive regulation may proscribe efficient market
activity and may create more clear channels for undesirable conduct (by-
products of the same kind of over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness
that exists in disclosure regulation).55
In sum, the federal system of securities regulation in the United States
uses disclosure regulation, fraud and misstatement liability and substantive
regulation to promote investor protection, fair and honest markets and
capital formation.
Government intervention in securities markets to put
information in investors' hands and to protect investors
against corporate abuses serves a distributional goal by
protecting investors against losses. Such government
intervention also serves the larger goal of promoting capital
formation and more efficient and liquid securities markets
53 See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REv. 577, 584 n.27
(2012) ("Although Dodd-Frank ostensibly was intended to respond to weaknesses
in the regulation of financial institutions, Congress included a number of corporate
governance provisions (say-on-pay and proxy access, for example) . . . ."); J.
Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Governance, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Limits of Disclosure, 57 CATH. U. L. REv. 45, 79 (2007)
("The Act interjected the Commission more deeply into the governance process,
partly through the regulation of audit committees and partly through the authority
to assign specific duties and obligations in connection with the development of
internal controls.").
54 Ripken, supra note 27, at 194-95.
55 See Schwarcz, supra note 39, at 21-23 (identifying these two drawbacks in
discussing the potential effects of prohibiting structured transactions).
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in that investor protection regulation can shore up investor
confidence in the integrity of securities markets.56
Principles from prevailing theory inform critiques of and adjustments to the
existing regulatory system. This seamless inter-relationship of policy,
theory and doctrine defines the nature and scope of U.S. securities
regulation.
B. Securities
The concept of a security-the subject (and an object) of securities
regulation-is significantly more complex than it appears. Most observers
would readily identify equity instruments (i.e. common stock and preferred
stock) and perhaps even some forms of indebtedness (e.g,, debentures) as
securities. However, few likely would know or be able to explain why
certain types of indebtedness are not securities, or why a pay telephone or a
tract of land in an orange grove, coupled with a related servicing agreement
to provide for harvesting the coinage from the telephone or the fruit from
the tract of land, respectively, is a security.57 This part briefly summarizes
the current U.S. federal law defining a security as a foundation for the
observations and ideas that follow.
1. The Statutory Base
The classification of a financial interest as a security is, first and
foremost, a statutory matter. Both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act include
statutory provisions defining what a "security" is.58 They are similar, but
not quite the same. 59 The structure of the definition is, however, identical
under the two statutes.
60
56 Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 975, 1005 (2006)
(noting that regulation in the name of investor protection may extend too far-to
the extent that markets and capital formation are negatively impacted-stating
"[s]ometimes, though, increased investor protection, such as through more
mandatory disclosure and more aggressive SEC oversight and enforcement, can
impede market participation and thus undercut the capital formation process and
the efficiency and liquidity of securities markets").
17 See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004) (involving the
pay telephone scenario); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293
(1946) (involving the orange grove scenario).
58 Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006), amended by Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006), amended by Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
'9 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); id. § 78c(a)(10); see also Miriam R. Albert, The
Howey Test Turns 64: Are the Courts Grading This Test on a Curve?, 2 WM. &
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Specifically, unless the circumstances dictate another result (i.e. "unless
the context otherwise requires"), a financial interest is a security if it is
included in a list of financial instruments (subject, under the 1934 Act, to
certain exceptions). 6' This list includes the usual suspects-e.g., stock,
notes, bonds, debentures and options-as well as certain less familiar, more
nebulous categories of financial instrument.62 These less familiar categories
include, e.g., a "participation in any profit-sharing agreement" and an
"investment contract. ' 63 Neither of these terms is defined in either statute.64
Both statutory provisions (under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act) also
include catchall clauses that incorporate into the definition "in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security' .... ,,65
These statutory definitions in the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act leave
significant room for regulatory and judicial interpretation. In particular, the
concept of "context" raises questions about the status of instruments labeled
as, e.g., stock and notes.66 In addition, the less familiar (profit-sharing
participation and investment contract) and catchall categories of
instruments require supplementary definitional content in order to have
meaning. Some of these labeling questions have been answered, and some
MARY BUS. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2011); C. Steven Bradford, Expanding the Investment
Company Act: The SEC's Manipulation of the Definition of Security, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 995, 999 (1999); James D. Redwood, Toward a More Enlightened Securities
Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court? Don't Bank on It Anytime Soon, 32 Hous. L.
REv. 3, 4 n.2 (1995). The two definitions typically are treated as substantial
equivalents. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982) ("We
have consistently held that the definition of 'security' in the 1934 Act is essentially
the same as the definition of 'security' in § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933...
."); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975) ("The
definition of a security in § 3(a) (10) of the 1934 Act ... is virtually identical [to
the definition in the Securities Act of 1933] and, for present purposes, the coverage
of the two Acts may be considered the same." (citations omitted)); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967) ("The same Congress which passed the
Securities Act in 1933 approved the Securities Exchange Act in 1934, and the
definition of security contained in the 1934 Act is virtually identical to that in the
earlier enactment.").60 See JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 19 (6th ed. 2009).
61 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10).
62 See id.
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., Albert, supra note 59, at 6 (noting that the "investment contract" term
is not defined in either the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act).
65 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); see also id. § 78c(a)(10).
66 See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (analyzing notes as a
security); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (analyzing
stock as a security).
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of the detailed definitional content has been supplied in the almost eighty
years since Congress enacted the statutes.
2. The Important Role of Decisional Law
Because the SEC has not regulated significantly in this area, most of the
heavy lifting in answering labeling questions and defining substantive
content has been left to the federal courts. U.S. federal decisional law
defining a security has engaged a variety of issues over time. The standard
securities regulation casebook samples liberally from this rich body of law
67
to help students learn how to analyze and resolve important issues related to
both the offer and sale of financial interests in business firms and the
governance rights of the holders of those financial interests. The opinions in
these cases provide significant, but not comprehensive, guidance.
Although there are key cases analyzing, e.g., when stock and debt
instruments are (and are not) securities, 68 many of the most significant and
difficult cases involve determinations of whether particular financial
interests are investment contracts (and therefore securities).
These judicial decisions take into account, to varying
degrees, the underlying legislative purposes of the federal
securities laws to provide investor protection through
mandatory disclosure of the information investors need to
make informed investment decisions and, through anti-
fraud liability, to put some teeth into the mandatory
disclosure requirements by imposing significant penalties
for violations thereof As a result of the disclosure
requirements and anti-fraud liability, investors and
securities markets arguably will have the information
needed to move capital to its optimal uses.
These judicial decisions also reflect the desire for
flexibility that is manifest in the legislative history of both
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Congress intentionally avoided a
rigid statutory definition of security in an effort to give the
courts flexibility in interpreting this important and far-
reaching concept.69
67 See, e.g., COX ET AL., supra note 60, at 20-90.
68 See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64-67 (outlining and adopting the family resemblance test
for determining whether notes are securities); Forman, 421 U.S. at 851 (describing
attributes of stock that make it a security).
69 Albert, supra note 59, at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
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The seminal case defining an "investment contract" is the Howey
case. v° In this landmark opinion on the status of financial interests under
U.S. securities law, the Court determined that
an investment contract . . . means a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led
to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party,
it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced
by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets
employed in the enterprise.71
This definition has become the touchstone for determining investment
contract status under both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.
In a later case, the Court indicated that an investment contract is the
equivalent, for definitional purposes, of an "interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security.', 72 Lower courts have found that the
Howey test also describes or helps identify a "participation in any profit-
sharing agreement" for purposes of the statutory definition of a security.
73
The "investment contract" aspect of the definition of a "security" in the
1933 Act and the 1934 Act provides the background for new observations
about the concept of a security in the crowdfunding era.74
III. CROWDFUNDED OFFERINGS AND CROWDFUNDING INSTRUMENTS
BEFORE THE JOBS ACT
The advent of crowdfunding has put significant pressure on the
regulation of securities under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, in general,
and the definition of a security, in particular. Crowdfunding, as originally
70 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
71 Id. at 298-99.
72 Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 ("We perceive no distinction, for present purposes,
between an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a
"security."').
73 See, e.g., Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 102 (7th Cir. 1977)
("[C]ourts have made no real distinction between investment contracts and profit-
sharing plans."); Trostle v. Nimer, 510 F. Supp. 568, 572 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (noting
that "[i]n most contexts," the two are synonymous).74 See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws,
2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 30-42 (2012); Edan Burkett, A Crowdfunding
Exemption? Online Investment Crowdfunding and U.S. Securities Regulation, 13
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 63, 79-82 (2011); Thomas Lee Hazen,
Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws-Why
the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure,
90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1739-40 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan
Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78
TENN. L. REV. 879, 885-906 (2011).
2012 What Is a Security in the 357
Crowdfunding Era?
conceived, was a form of crowdsourcing financial capital.75 It allows
entrepreneurs to use an Internet-based "crowd" to fund their ventures.76 The
growing success of crowdfunding eventually compelled federal and state
regulatory interest, since many of the crowdfunding sites were offering (or
desired to offer) interests in businesses or projects that were (or might be
deemed to be) securities. 77 In an ostensible bid to harness the potential
power of crowdfunding for the benefit of these entrepreneurs,78 Congress
passed the CRO WDFUND Act as part of the JOBS Act, and the President
signed it into law in the spring of 2012.
7 9
75 See, e.g., Paul Belleflamme et al., Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd 2
(Apr. 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1578175 ("The concept of crowdfunding finds its root in the broader concept of
crowdsourcing."); id. at 6 ("[T]he concept of crowdfunding can be seen as part of
the broader concept of crowdsourcing, which refers to using the 'crowd' to obtain
ideas, feedback and solutions in order to develop corporate activities."); Kristina
Dell, Crowdfunding, TIME, Sept. 4, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,1838768,00.html ("The term crowdfunding derives from another
neologism: crowdsourcing, i.e., outsourcing to the public jobs typically performed
by employees."); ARMIN SCHWIENBACHER & BENJAMIN LARRALDE, HANDBOOK OF
ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 373 (2012) ("Crowdfunding can be viewed as an
element of crowdsourcing.").
76 See, e.g., Belleflamme et al., supra note 75, at 2 ("[I]nstead of raising the money
from a very small group of sophisticated investors, the idea of crowdfunding is to
obtain it from a large audience (the 'crowd'), where each individual will provide a
very small amount."); C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding
Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. (forthcoming Fall 2012)
(manuscript at 2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2066088 ("Crowdfunding is the use of the Internet to raise money through small
donations from a large number of people-the 'crowd' in crowdfunding.").
71 See Bradford, supra 76 (manuscript at 5-6); Stuart R. Cohn, The New
Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L.
REv. 1433, 1436-38 (2012); Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 74, at 882-84.
78 Views on whether Congress is, in fact, supporting entrepreneurialism through the
CROWDFUND Act and the greater JOBS Act are uncertain and decidedly mixed.
See Catherine Clifford, Crowdfunding's Wild West Awaits a Stampede,
ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/223234;
Steven M. Davidoff, From Congress, a Law Befitting a Sausage Factory, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 3, 2012, 4:18 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/
04/03/from-congress-a-law-befitting-a-sausage-factory/; Nick Jensen, New Law
Will Help Entrepreneurs Raise Money: Crowdfund Act, UNDER30CEO (Apr. 6,
2012), http://under30ceo.comlnew-law-will-help-entrepreneurs-raise-money-
crowdfund-act/.
79 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The CROWDFUND Act
is Title III of the JOBS Act. See id. §§ 301-05
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A. Crowdfunding Models
The market for crowdfunding and crowdfunded interests in business
ventures that developed before enactment of the JOBS Act (and that has
continued after its adoption, but before its full implementation) resulted
from creative and, in some cases, bold entrepreneurial decision-making and
action. Crowdfunding has been used to support both entity-based capital
formation (i.e. financing for an entire firm) and project-based business
initiatives (typically, for sole proprietors or small groups of individuals-
like indie and rock bands-that the law likely would characterize as
partnerships in the absence of a more formal chartered entity status).
Crowdfunding has been employed to finance traditional for-profit
businesses, traditional non-profit businesses and social enterprises that
combine a prototypical investor profit-maximization orientation with
objectives that maximize environmental or social utility.
A number of different taxonomies have been introduced to describe the
types of funding sites and financial interests that developed during this
time. Professor Steven Bradford offers and describes one of these
taxonomies in a recent law journal article. 80
One can categorize crowdfunding into five types,
distinguished by what investors are promised in return for
their contributions: (1) the donation model; (2) the reward
model; (3) the pre-purchase model; (4) the lending model;
and (5) the equity model. Some crowdfunding sites
encompass more than one model; it is especially common
to see the reward and pre-purchase models on a single web
site. Other sites rely on only a single model. 8'
Another taxonomy differentiates crowdfunding into two forms, based
on the existence of a consumption interest on the part of the funder while
80 See Bradford, supra note 74, at 14-27.
81 Id. at 14-15.
82 Belleflamme et al., supra note 75, at 3 ("In the first form, consumers are invited
to pre-order the product. For the entrepreneur to be able to launch production, the
amount collected through pre-ordering must cover the required amount of capital.
Since the remaining consumers will pay a different price when the product is on the
market, crowdfunding that takes the form of pre-ordering gives the opportunity to
price discriminate between the first group (those who pre-order and thus constitute
the funding 'crowd') and the second group (the other 'regular' consumers who wait
that [sic] production takes place before purchasing directly). This form of
crowdfunding appears thus as a special form of behavior-based price
discrimination, since consumers self-select themselves in one of the groups based
on their personal preferences. In the second form of crowdfunding, individuals are
invited to provide money to the entrepreneur in exchange for a share of the profits
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yet another (along similar lines) "distinguishes 'ex post facto
crowdfunding,' where financial support is offered in exchange for a
completed product, from 'ex ante crowdfunding,' where . . . financial
support is given on the front end to assist in achieving a mutually desired
result., 83 Nonprofit crowdfunding can be distinguished from for-profit
crowdfunding, and for-profit crowdfunding may or may not offer equity
participation to funders.84 Finally, "patronage crowdfunding," which
focuses on generating donated funds, can be differentiated from
"investment crowdfunding," which focuses on generating equity, debt or
81another similar financial interest in the funded business or project.
These taxonomies are individually useful in context for the purposes for
which they are offered; collectively, they help to identify both familiar and
new attributes of an innovative and less-defined venture finance market in
different analytical contexts. In the aggregate, they serve an important role:
they clarify that funding interests sold and bought through crowdfunded
offerings are non-uniform. These interests come in many flavors. Some
look more like charitable or other non-profit contributions, some may seem
akin to gambling bets and some resemble traditional equity and debt
interests. Some provide profit-sharing or revenue-sharing opportunities;
some do not. Among crowdfunding interests that include the promise or
possibility of current returns, some offer those returns for a short period
only; others, for the life of the entity or project. The non-financial investor
benefits embedded in these crowdfunding interests also vary significantly.
They may include, for example, tangible, consumer entitlements or
psychological or emotional affects. In this less-defined, highly contractual
investment environment, the dividing line between securities and non-
securities, as currently construed and applied, is somewhat unclear and,
even when clear, may be artificial or arbitrary.s6 Crowdfunding interests
regulated as securities are regulated under the relatively weighty realm of
securities regulation (federal and state), while those that are not securities
are subject to a different regulatory regime (e.g., charitable or other
nonprofit donation, gambling or consumer protection regulation). The
potential for confusion among crowdfunding participants (funders, website
or even to purchase equity securities issued by the entrepreneurial form. These
investors may or may not decide to become consumers in a later stage.").
83 Tim Kappel, Ex Ante Crowdfunding and the Recording Industry: A Model for
the U.S.?, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 375, 375 (2009).
84 See Nikki D. Pope, Crowdfunding Microstartups: It's Time for the Securities and
Exchange Commission to Approve a Small Offering Exemption, 13 U. PA. J. Bus.
L. 973, 977-81 (2011).
85 See Burkett, supra note 74, at 64.
86 See Heminway & Hoffnan, supra note 74, at 885-906 (analyzing crowdfunding
interests as securities); id. at 895 n.76 (noting that the application of securities
regulation to crowdfunding may depend on small differences in funding models).
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owners and providers and the venturers whose operations or projects are
being funded)-and regulatory mayhem-is evident.
B. Crowdfunded Business Interests at the Margin
Close to this dividing line between crowdfunded securities and
crowdfunding interests that are not classifiable as securities is a particular
type of financial interest that provides for profit-sharing or revenue-sharing
on a short-term basis, with no accompanying governance rights.87 This type
of interest is a security, but it is neither debt (because the funded business
or project has no obligation to repay the funder) nor traditional equity
(which typically combines, based on statutory mandate or contractual
provisions, financial and governance rights); it is properly classified as a
form of investment contract.88 The use of investment contracts of this
kind-unequity-became more prominent in the crowdfunding
environment that existed in the year or two before the U.S. federal
government began to take an interest in crowdfunding-the time period
leading up to Congress's adoption of the JOBS Act. Entrepreneurs were
creatively innovating new funding models that were designed to operate in
a business finance "sweet spot" that leverages social-network-like tools to
raise capital while avoiding the significant strictures of securities regulation
(or so they hoped). It was the Wild West of crowdfunding: a rough-and-
tumble period characterized by fast growth and legal risk-taking bordering
on lawlessness.
None of the taxonomies of crowdfunding adequately account for
unequity, likely because little attention has been given to this type of
investment interest in debates over the wisdom and efficacy of
crowdfunding. Yet, upon the authorization of crowdfunded securities
offerings under the JOBS Act, businesses and projects may lawfully be
funded through the sale of unequity interests as well as more traditional,
mainstream debt, equity, convertible, exchangeable and derivative interests.
Offers and sales of (and other transactions involving) unequity raise some,
but not all, of the same questions and concerns for issuers and investors that
transactions in conventional securities raise for issuers and investors. An
understanding of unequity enables a more full understanding of the
panorama of financial and related interests89 and instruments that exist and
87 The interests offered on the now-defunct crowdfunding site 33needs.com are
examples of this kind of security. See, e.g., id. at 891-904 (using 33needs.com as
an example of a crowdfunding interest that is an investment contract).
88 See id. at 885-906.
89 The concept of "related interests" referenced throughout the remainder of this
essay captures both the reality that non-financial interests are associated with and
embedded in traditional financial instruments and the further thought that interests
outside the traditional realm of financial interests (e.g., consumer interests,
charitable and other nonprofit donative interests and interests in gambling
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offers us a spectrum of interests and instruments that may be subject to
regulation in various contexts.
This spectrum of available and foreseeable financial instruments,
representing a significant variety of financial and related interests, is
important to the future of financial regulation. Identifying the points-large
and small-arrayed across this continuum is one of the unmet challenges in
reforming or redesigning the system of financial regulation in the United
States and elsewhere. It may be useful, for these purposes, to broaden the
set of interests considered to include related non-financial interests (which
may be bundled with financial interests in some financial instruments). For
example, based on the nature and extent of a funder's claim to pecuniary
assets of the venture (or the corresponding right of the venture to retain the
funding) offered in return for the interest offered, one might identify the
spectrum as ranging from (on one end) interests in goods and services-
consumer or consumptive interests, not pure financial interests-extending
through financial and related interests in the nature of charitable or other
nonprofit donations, gambling wagers, franchises, debt securities, equity
securities and commodities, and ending (on the other end of the spectrum)
with insurance and banking interests (and I am sure I am missing some
types of interest along the way). The range of interests and instruments
could also be defined by other identifying characteristics, including the
nature of the funder's claim to assets of the venture, if any (e.g., an interest
in goods or services, a claim to winnings from a game of chance, a right of
repayment, an short-term or long-term interest in the financial returns of the
venture or some combination of these and other interests). Policy and
theory are important to determining the attributes that may be of interest to
lawmakers, since the protection of the funder's interests is among the
objectives served by financial regulation.
In designing an appropriate and comprehensive system of regulation,
the first step is identifying these financial and related interests in some
detail. The next step involves identifying the significant financial and non-
financial attributes of the interests that comprise the spectrum and deciding
how (if at all), looking across this spectrum, these diverse instruments
should be regulated and in what contexts. Essentially, this involves
matching financial interests and instruments with regulatory structures and
directives that meet policy goals and account for applicable theory.
proceeds) may be arrayed with financial interests to form a more complete picture
of regulated interests emanating from pecuniary contributions to an enterprise.
362 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7:2
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
IV. MATCHING REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS TO INTERESTS AND
INSTRUMENTS
A closer look at the organic growth of crowdfunding in its early years
offers the opportunity-one among many, of late-to reflect on the
regulatory framework governing financial instruments. In the years
following the financial crisis, in particular, scholars and policy makers have
taken aim at the nature of financial regulation in the United States and
found the current structures and substantive provisions wanting. In
particular, numerous commentators have noted that the siloed nature of the
regulatory system for these instruments in the United States-regulation
that relies on the categorization of an instrument by type and the relegation
of each type of financial interest or instrument to its own body of
regulation-is outdated in an era of financial products that combine
attributes of historically distinct instruments. 90
However, much (but not all) of the discussion on financial regulatory
reform has focused on sophisticated financial institutions-including banks,
securities firms and insurance companies-and instruments, especially
those representing interests in securitized pools of assets, insurance
products, commodities, swaps, etc. 91 Unequity adds a new piece to the
puzzle. Currently, it is regulated as a security. But should it be? Although in
my prior work on specialized law reform focusing on crowdfunding I,
together with a coauthor, determined not to tinker with the regulation of
unequity as a security,92 that simple answer to the question seems
inadequate in the face of the larger task of regulatory reform and design.
The regulation of financial interests, instruments and offerings can and
should be rethought with the less sophisticated interests and instruments in
mind, as well as the more sophisticated interests and instruments.
90 See, e.g., Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: A Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection and
Heightening Corporate Responsibility in International Financial Transactions, 60
AM. U. L. REV. 1431 (2011); Saule Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules, and
Institutions: A Process for Reforming Financial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV.
881 (2009).
9' See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, The New Laws and Regulations for Financial
Conglomerates: Will They Better Manage the Risks Than the Previous Ones?, 60
AM. U. L. REV. 1339, 1341 (2011) (analyzing financial conglomerates-firms that
own securities, insurance and depository institutions); Houman B. Shadab, Guilty
By Association? Regulating Credit Default Swaps, 4 ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 407,
419-30 (2010) (describing the regulation of and regulatory reforms applicable to
credit default swaps); Charles K. Whitehead, Refraining Financial Regulation, 90
B.U. L. REv. 1, 5 (2010) (focusing on banks, securities firms and insurance
companies).
92 See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 74, at 941-42.
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How might we go about the task of thinking through this recasting of
our financial regulatory structure in the United States knowing what we
now know about financial and related interests across a broad spectrum
from consumer interests to interests in bank deposits? A few years ago,
Professors Saule Omarova and Adam Feibelman made some valuable
observations, advising general caution in approaching financial regulatory
reforms:
There may be several methods of drawing the regulatory
and supervisory lines: by product or function, target
customer base, size and complexity of operations, and so
forth. It is essential to keep an open mind about the
outcome of this inquiry. In the process of gathering,
processing, and analyzing empirical information about
today's financial industry, the outlines of potential new
substantive approaches to regulation and supervision will
inevitably begin to take shape.93
This essay, in essence, picks up one of the threads of analysis suggested
by Professors Omarova and Feibelman-by preliminarily suggesting a
more inclusive way in which regulatory and supervisory lines may be
drawn by product. The nascent ideas shared here with regard to the
characteristics of financial and related interests and instruments establish a
basis for further thought and study and (possibly) action in reforming or
redesigning the overall framework of financial regulation.
A. Salient Attributes of Financial Regulatory Systems and Financial
Instruments
Financial regulation in the United States has been constructed on the
basis of individualized financial institutions and the instruments they design
and offer. Yet, these lines have become blurred.
The financial services industry has seen a significant
convergence of the banking, securities, and insurance
market segments in recent years. Unfortunately, regulatory
architecture in the United States has not adapted to reflect
changing industry configurations. Rather, U.S. regulatory
architecture has remained complex and fragmented in the
face of industry "consolidation," "conglomeration," and
"convergence., 94
93 Omarova & Feibelman, supra note 90, at 919 (footnote omitted).
94 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Risky Business: The Credit Crisis and Failure (Part I),
104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 398, 413-14 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
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In our current world of hybridized financial institutions and interests,
this regulatory framework simply is no longer rational or feasible. Other
national governments have moved away from a scheme of regulation
founded on distinct areas of financial regulation based on characterizations
of instruments along identifiable product lines and toward other regulatory
models that focus on, e.g., common risks. In addition to its untenable basis
in increasingly indistinct product categories, the current U.S. regulatory
framework has a number of disadvantages, including a multiplicity of
regulators at the federal and state levels of government.
The U.S. remains distant from the international trend
toward integrated supervision. Banking, securities, and
insurance regulators remain separate. Moreover, even
within each of these traditional regimes, there are multiple
regulators, i.e., multiple bank regulators, multiple securities
regulators, and multiple insurance regulators.95
The existence of multiple regulators and regulatory frameworks masks
significant similarities in both the separately governed instruments and the
nature of the regulatory mandates. In fact, there is much commonality in the
regulated instruments and the distinct systems of regulation that constitute
U.S. financial regulation. The regulated instruments typically are forms of
personal property. And the various existing systems of regulation all have
common policy roots in protecting the owners of those instruments
(funders) from fraud, deception and other business practices that are, in
some way, unfair.96 At the same time, these systems of regulation also
protect the industries and markets that they regulate--deeming those
industries and markets worthy of encouragement.
One result, based on commonalities in applicable theories linking
information to transparency and markets, is that the components of the
existing regulatory framework rely heavily on disclosure as a regulatory
tool. 97 The nature and extent of disclosure does, however, differ, given that
95 Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role of Central Banks in Bank Supervision in the
United States andthe United Kingdom, 28 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 411,440 (2003).
96 See, e.g., Peter C. Lagarias & Robert S. Boulter, The Modern Reality of the
Controlling Franchisor: The Case for More, Not Less, Franchisee Protections, 29
FRANCHISE L.J. 139, 139-40 (2010) ("Franchise disclosure legislation followed
employment, securities, banking, insurance, and other regulations implemented to
temper abuses in the free-market economy. Core concerns leading to most such
remedial legislation were fraud and other unfair or deceptive practices.").
97 See, e.g., Ripken, supra note 27, at 153 n.44 ("Disclosure is a remedy for
informational asymmetries in markets other than securities as well. For example,
information disclosure can be beneficial in the context of healthcare."); Cass R.
Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 407, 424 (1990)
("Congress and agencies have imposed disclosure regulations in many areas,
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the underlying theories vary in their application to different industries and
markets and the behavior of participants in those markets. Disclosure
requirements do and should vary based on context. Some requirements,
including the mandatory disclosure requirements in securities regulation,
are more in the nature of principles and are imposed and employed in
decision-making ex ante; others, including the antifraud provisions in
federal securities regulation, are more in the nature of standards that may
impact ex ante decision-making but are applied ex post in enforcement
proceedings.
Yet, there also are significant differences in existing regulated
instruments and in the regulatory systems comprising the current U.S.
financial regulatory framework. Some of these systems engage other, more
substantive, regulatory tools that are more intrusive on the nature of the
operations of the regulated businesses. These other regulatory tools include,
for example, "activity restrictions, capital adequacy requirements, reserve
requirements, conditions on affiliate transactions, . . . etc."98 Traditional
consumer product and service regulation, for example, typically includes
few of these more intrusive, paternalistic tools of regulation.9 Banking
regulation includes many.
Bank regulation tends to be protective or paternalistic. The
agency restricts the number of firms that can enter the
banking business, and deals with banks' financial problems
secretly for fear of precipitating a "run on the bank." In the
securities business, on the other hand, there are no
restrictions on entry, and the whole regulatory emphasis is
on full disclosure-making all the bad news publicly
available and letting the market decide.'00
Although the specific regulatory tools along this continuum are virtually
infinite, the range of tools is well understood and forms a basis for the
design and construction of a more comprehensive and fluid financial
regulatory structure.
The similarities and differences in corporate finance instruments and
regulatory rules and norms raise questions about optimal financial
regulation. If we can adequately sort through the different types of financial
ranging from occupational and environmental risks to potentially deceptive
advertising.").
98 Omarova & Feibelman, supra note 90, at 884.
99 See Kurt Eggert, Striking a Balance: Basic Questions About Consumer
Protection Law, 7 CHAP. L. RE-v. 1, 8 (2004) (noting that, in consumer protection
regimes, "[r]estrictions on types or terms of agreements and banning certain
abusive practices are less universally popular").
100 David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey, 16 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1765, 1773 (1995).
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and related interests and plot them across a spectrum-or perhaps even
multiple spectrums or dimensions of a spectrum based on various factors
related to policy and theory-then we should be able to match the interests
to different regulatory tools based on underlying policy and theory and
construct a more sound and rational overall framework for financial
regulation in the United States-and, perhaps, in time, for the world as a
whole.'O I am not alone in suggesting that the prudent reconstruction of
financial regulation begins with a detailed assessment of the existing
landscape.
Various structural factors, including increasing
globalization of financial markets, growth of large financial
conglomerates with international operations, convergence
of financial products and services traditionally offered by
institutions separated by sectoral lines, and rising
importance of institutional investors, have rendered many
of the traditional regulatory boundaries among different
categories of financial institutions such as commercial
banks, thrifts, securities and insurance firms, etc., largely
meaningless and inefficient. Thus, the first step in the
process of a comprehensive regulatory reform should focus
on re-drawing the relevant boundaries within the modern
financial services sector, that is, redefining the relevant
segments of the industry and assessing the key risks
inherent in each segment.
°2
I contend, as Professors Omarova and Feibelman suggest, that to re-draw
these boundaries and redefine these industrial segments, we must first focus
on the nature of the full spectrum of financial and related interests and
instruments that exist and can be envisioned. Unequity and other less
sophisticated instruments should be factored into this spectrum.
B. Regulation of Financial Interests and Instruments Across One or
More Spectrums
A foundational task, then, for those bent on financial regulatory reform
is to identify the full range of financial and related interests and array them
across one or more spectrums based on their salient attributes. The focus of
this exercise should be on the market participants intended to be protected
by the regulation-those who will acquire, use, dispose of and otherwise
101 This essay assumes that, for the foreseeable future, financial regulation will
continue to be the province of national governments, despite the global nature of
financial services and transactions.
102 Omarova & Feibelman, supra note 90, at 911-12 (footnote omitted).
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transact in or conduct businesses that relate to the instruments that embody
these interests-as well as the markets themselves.
As part of this dual-track exercise of articulating regulatory
objectives and lining up regulatory techniques,
policymakers will have to define and redefine key
regulatory boundaries within the financial industry. Which
types of business activities or market segments should be
grouped together and be regulated under a common
scheme? Conversely, which types of activities or market
segments should be separated for regulatory purposes? And
should such activities be conducted in separate entities
subject to different regulatory regimes? These decisions are
likely to be based, among other factors, on the types of
risks embedded in the nature of the given business
activities, the dynamics of the relevant market, and the role
of various types of financial institutions within these
markets. 103
Each of these factors may be the basis of a distinct spectrum of
regulated products or transactions or business activities or markets. What
similar and different risks are attendant to consumer products producers and
services providers, charities and other nonprofit entities, gambling
establishments, franchises of various kinds, small-cap, mid-cap and large-
cap issuers of unequity, debt and equity, insurance firms, financial services
firms, etc.? What common and unique dynamics exist in the markets for the
various different products, services, financial and related interests and
instruments that these businesses purvey? And what role do various
commercial, investment and other economic or monetarily-oriented
principals and intermediaries play in these markets?
This essay is designed to further the conversation on financial
regulation in a limited way by identifying securities as an important and
diverse set of regulated instruments. Securities, often treated in the
regulatory framework as somewhat homogenous, reflect, in and of
themselves, a broad range of different financial and related interests. These
interests are embedded in a variety of instruments that extend from
unequity in the form of investment contracts (which, in the crowdfunding
era, have often represented merely a short-term, limited claim to profits or
revenues, with no governance engagement), through common stock and
preferred stock, to secured debt (which represents a more assured claim on
the funded venture). As the United States rethinks its financial regulatory
framework, policy makers should take account of the full array of interests
and instruments commonly identified as securities.
103 Omarova & Feibelman, supra note 90, at 916-17.
368 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7:2
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
C. Situating Securities in the Spectrums of Financial and Related
Interests and Instruments
Based on the nature of the regulatory tools employed, the existing
system of securities regulation is somewhere in the middle of the current
financial regulatory landscape in the United States. Securities regulation
(like the regulation of consumer products and services, charitable and other
nonprofit enterprises, gambling establishments, insurance providers and
banks) engages disclosure as a prominent regulatory tool. Yet, securities
regulation does not employ the kinds of heavy-handed substantive
regulation of financial condition imposed on the insurance and banking
industries, including the "prudential" safety-and-soundness strictures that
are distinctive to banking regulation. 10 4 Securities regulation does, however,
engage in some forms of substantive regulation that distinguish it from a
legal governance regime based solely or almost exclusively on disclosure
controls. 1
05
Is this where the regulation of securities belongs in the overall national
financial regulatory structure? Does it make sense to regulate all
instruments classified as securities in a way that is common as among
securities and distinct from interests in consumer products, the operations
of charitable and other nonprofit enterprises, the proceeds of games of
chance, the benefits payable under insurance contracts and bank deposits?
Core commonalities, including the need to correct information
asymmetries, argue for a common system of regulation, yet important
differences among securities (specifically) and financial and related
interests and instruments (more generally) remain.
To locate securities in potential spectrums of financial and related
interests that provide a basis for regulatory reform requires, first, that we
characterize both the spectrum and the different types of securities in more
detail. Although all securities assume the potential to make money by
parting with money, the similarities may end there. Crowdfunding interests
in the form of investment contracts are especially difficult to categorize
since the range of terms they may embody is particularly fluid. Investors
may have mixed motives in purchasing them. While they have an
expectation of "profits" generated by from a common enterprise and by the
efforts of others,'0 6 they also may acquire these financial and related
interests with the clear understanding that they will have no governance
rights over the enterprise and will never recoup the full value of their
investment through current returns, repayment or resale. They may just
104 See, e.g., Joseph Jude Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate
Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1299, 1300 n.4 (1989) (defining prudential regulation).
105 See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
106 See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
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want a small amount of "skin in the game" in supporting the development
of a business or project. This limited profit motive does not make these
investors irrational, however. They may just be maximizing utility in a
different, more complex way. The reasons these investors have for funding
a business or project may be mixed. Their motives, in addition to monetary
rewards, may be, for example, consumptive (if they are also getting a
product or service-a consumption interest-in return for funding the
business or project) or altruistic (bettering society). Existing discussions
and models have failed to take these unequity interests into account.
Crowdfunding interests, including unequity, that developed in the era
preceding the JOBS Act illustrate that securities are more complex than the
current system of securities regulation may contemplate. For instance, the
existing system of securities regulation all but effectively ignores the
complexity of unequity in employing many of its regulatory tools, just as it
ignores the complexity of more sophisticated financial instruments
classified as securities-those that share attributes with commodities,
insurance or banking products. The risks and rewards of unequity are not
merely the risks associated with consumer products and services, charitable
and other nonprofit donations or gambling bets. They also are not the same
risks and rewards that are associated with traditional equity and debt
instruments classified as securities-which tend to be longer-term and
include statutory and contractual governance rights. And the risks and
rewards of unequity most certainly are not the risks and rewards associated
with insurance products or bank deposits.
Therefore, an important task for those of us who understand the full
range of instruments classifiable as securities is to create a better taxonomy
of these instruments by looking more closely at the financial and related
interests that characterize these instruments and assessing them in light of
applicable theory and the policy interests to be served by comprehensive
financial regulation. This is a tall order and a task that should be
approached in a thorough, methodical manner. It should involve
participation by the regulators and the regulated and, yes, by those of us in
the academy. Financial regulation is too important to our economy, our
society-our lives-to be determined by political forces disconnected from
detailed knowledge of the interests, instruments, transactions and markets at
issue. This knowledge is built from many sources (experience, empirical
studies, etc.).
Perhaps this effort will reveal that the common attributes of financial
and related interests and instruments, the enterprises that offer and sell
them, and the markets in which they are offered and sold make a junction-
box regulatory system desirable-a system of regulation in which the
common regulatory tools are all found in one statutory or other body of
rules, governed by a single regulator, with specialized bodies of rules and
personnel for financial products and offerings that have certain distinct
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identifiable attributes. A single instrument offered in a specific way might
engage one or more of these specialized bodies of regulatory rules and
personnel as well as the general set of rules. Although the possibility for
this type of regulatory system is imaginable (in fact, almost palpable), its
realization would require substantial diligence and a significant rethinking
of current regulatory rules and structures. The costs of this level of
diligence and rethinking may well exceed the potential benefits.
V. CONCLUSION
This essay both assumes and, in certain respects, illustrates that the U.S.
system of financial regulation has become outdated in light of the
increasing complexity and fluidity of financial and related interests and
instruments-focusing especially on those classified as securities. In
attempting to keep pace with this complexity and fluidity, the overall
financial regulatory structure has become too complex to be effective-or
even sustainable.
[T]he U.S. regulatory system needs to be simplified and
moved away from a functional regulatory structure towards
one that regulates based on the risks posed by the products,
services, or firms. The complexity and costs of the current
structure encouraged firms to seek ways to avoid it. These
incentives have only been heightened with the new, more
complex structure created by the Dodd-Frank Act.
In addition, the structure's very complexity was part of
the reason that firms were able to engage in regulatory
arbitrage in the first place. The structure is based on rigid
definitions for banking, securities, and insurance products
that allowed them to create hybrid products, services, or
firms that failed to fit within those definitions. By minding
the gaps in the U.S. regulatory structure, financial firms
were able to take on excessive risks and create and sell
questionable products and services.1°7
Efficacious regulatory reform depends on a process that consists of
more than the legislative and agency reactions to political imperatives that
have characterized reform efforts to date. Successful reform will come from
an assessment of the full range of financial and related interests,
instruments and offerings to be regulated and the processing of this
knowledge taking into account both theory and policy. Those of us with
knowledge of securities and securities regulation must participate actively
in the regulatory conversation, taking into account our unique knowledge of
107 Brown, supra note 91, at 1414.
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the financial instruments that may be classified as securities and their role
in market transactions.
[T]wo primary challenges in regulating capital markets are,
first, to identify risks within these markets and, second, to
identify mechanisms that can lessen or manage those risks.
Questions about how to allocate these mechanisms within a
regulatory structure should be answered in light of
policymakers' conclusions regarding what to regulate and
how to regulate it.'
08
To best engage an analysis that will contribute effectively to the
broader conversation about an optimal system of financial regulation in the
United States, we must first determine in a more rigorous and
comprehensive way what a security is and then identify the different types
of risks that securities and transactions in securities entail. The integration
of this knowledge with similar knowledge from other areas of financial
regulation-and from regulatory areas that govern financial and related
interests not traditionally characterized as financial regulation (like
consumer protection, charitable and other nonprofit solicitations and
gambling)-will provide us with enough information to better parse and
delineate the required or desired regulatory structures and identify the
needed regulatory tools. The success of this venture, however, also depends
on a well-articulated set of policy objectives-one more well-defined than
we now have-and the development of, and attentiveness to, applicable
theory. Although the ideas presented here are important new pieces of the
puzzle, much work remains to be done.
108 Omarova & Feibelman, supra note 90, at 883.
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